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Background: Molecular phylogenetic analyses are used increasingly in the epidemiological investigation of
outbreaks and transmission cases involving rapidly evolving RNA viruses. Here, we present the results of such an
analysis that contributed to the conviction of an anesthetist as being responsible for the infection of 275 of his
patients with hepatitis C virus.
Results: We obtained sequences of the NS5B and E1-E2 regions in the viral genome for 322 patients suspected to
have been infected by the doctor, and for 44 local, unrelated controls. The analysis of 4,184 cloned sequences of
the E1-E2 region allowed us to exclude 47 patients from the outbreak. A subset of patients had known dates of
infection. We used these data to calibrate a relaxed molecular clock and to determine a rough estimate of the time
of infection for each patient. A similar analysis led to an estimate for the time of infection of the source. The date
turned out to be 10 years before the detection of the outbreak. The number of patients infected was small at first,
but it increased substantially in the months before the detection of the outbreak.
Conclusions: We have developed a procedure to integrate molecular phylogenetic reconstructions of rapidly
evolving viral populations into a forensic setting adequate for molecular epidemiological analysis of outbreaks and
transmission events. We applied this procedure to a large outbreak of hepatitis C virus caused by a single source
and the results obtained played a key role in the trial that led to the conviction of the suspected source.
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Over the last few decades, molecular phylogenetic analyses
of RNA viruses have been used frequently in the study of
outbreaks and transmission chains [1-5]. Occasionally,
these analyses have been used in courts to provide evidence
in cases in which the ascertainment of the source of an out-
break would lead to economic compensation being paid to
the infected victims [1,6]. On one occasion this type of
evidence was accepted in a criminal case, and contributed
to the conviction of a physician for the attempted homicide* Correspondence: fernando.gonzalez@uv.es
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumof his former lover by deliberate injection of blood infected
with hepatitis C virus (HCV) and human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) [4]. These and other cases [7] usually
involve only one or just a few transmission events produced
in a short period of time.
HCV, a member of family Flaviviridae, is a positive
sense single-stranded RNA virus. The size of its genome is
about 9.6 kb. The genome encodes a polyprotein of about
3,000 amino acids in length, which is processed by host and
viral proteases to release 3 structural (core, E1, E2) and 7
non-structural (p7, NS2-NS5B) proteins (reviewed in [8]).
About 160 million people worldwide are infected with
HCV [9] and around 80% of those infected progress to
chronic infection. Up to 20% of infected individuals develop
HCV-related complications, for example hepatocellular
carcinoma, cirrhosis, or liver failure [10]. The natural
history of the infection is quite variable, ranging fromed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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long periods of asymptomatic infection during which
the virus can be transmitted to other hosts. The virus
spreads primarily by blood-to-blood contact. The main
routes of transmission are intravenous drug use, un-
screened blood transfusions (in the developing world)
and other incorrect medical procedures, especially those
that involve reuse of needles and syringes [11].
In February 1998, a series of HCV infection cases were
detected among patients who had undergone minor sur-
gery at a private hospital in the city of Valencia, Spain.
Public health officials launched an epidemiological investi-
gation that revealed a likely common source for these new
infections to be an anesthetist who regularly worked at the
hospital in question and another public hospital nearby
[12]. In the ensuing weeks, the active search for other po-
tentially infected patients led to the detection of a large out-
break possibly involving hundreds of patients, all of them
related to the activity of this medical professional. Almost
all the patients had been previously treated in the two
hospitals where the anesthetist practiced regularly. The epi-
demiological evidence gathered during the first 3 months of
investigation confirmed the initial suspicions of the exist-
ence of an outbreak linked to the professional activity of
this particular anesthetist. The epidemiologists examined
the association of over 66,000 people who had undergone
surgery in the 2 hospitals with the usual risk factors for
infection in surgical procedures: surgeon, surgery room,
type of surgery, anesthesiologist, type of anesthesia, and so
on. The only significant factor (adjusted OR 28.5, 95% CI
9.83 to 82.59) was this anesthetist (H. Vanaclocha, DGSP-
Conselleria de Sanidad, Generalitat Valenciana, and F.
Martinez, Centro Nacional Epidemiología, SPAIN). Fur-
thermore, of the initial 197 cases considered to be included
in the outbreak, 184 had been anesthetized by him. No
additional links were found among these patients, nor the
ones who were included later on. Other hypotheses for the
possible sources of infection were discarded on the basis of
the epidemiological evidence.
Public health authorities and the judge in charge of the
corresponding epidemiological and judicial investigations
requested our expertise in evolutionary biology in order to
(i) check whether the suspected source was actually respon-
sible for the outbreak, (ii) ascertain which patients had been
infected from a common source and could be considered
as included in the outbreak and who had been infected
from alternative sources, (iii) discard alternative sources or
the existence of different but simultaneous outbreaks, (iv)
determine the duration of the outbreak, (v) date the time of
infection for each patient involved in the outbreak, and (vi)
determine the date of infection of the source.
Here, we present a molecular and evolutionary epi-
demiological analysis of this outbreak based on HCV
sequences obtained from the presumed source and thepatients. The analysis was used to discriminate who
out of the potential victims had actually been infected
by the common source, to provide an individual assessment
of the likelihood of this assignment, and to obtain an esti-
mate of the date of infection for each patient. These results
helped the court to convict the anesthetist of professional
malpractice leading to the infection of 275 of his patients.
Results
We received serum samples of 322 HCV-1a and 290
HCV-1b positive patients who had been in contact with
the presumed source (PS) or had been attended at any of
the hospitals where he worked regularly. Once we deter-
mined that the PS carried only HCV-1a (see below), HCV-
1b samples were not processed further. We also determined
the sequences in 44 samples from persons infected with
HCV-1a in the city of Valencia who were not related to the
outbreak, based on the epidemiological evidence, and
whose sera had been stored at −80°C in local hospitals.
These samples were used as local controls. The nucleotide
sequence of two HCV genome regions was determined
after reverse transcription (RT) of viral RNA into DNA
followed by hemi-nested polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
A 229-nucleotide (nt) fragment of the NS5B gene, which
encodes the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase of the virus,
was analyzed by direct Sanger sequencing of PCR products.
This region corresponds to a relatively conserved portion
of the viral genome [13] and the method used provides only
a consensus sequence of the whole spectrum of genetic
variability present in each sample. The second region
we analyzed was a 406-nt fragment encompassing the
C-terminal end of the envelope-1 and the N-terminal of
the envelope-2 glycoprotein (E1-E2 region). This much
more variable region of the HCV genome was analyzed by
sequencing at least ten viral inserts cloned in recombinant
plasmids derived from RT-PCR products per patient.
We obtained 320 sequences of the NS5B region from
HCV-1a samples and 44 from local population controls.
The nucleotide sequence of each sample was compared
to that of the PS and the distribution of differences
(Hamming distance) was determined (Figure 1). The NS5B
sequence obtained from the PS sample corresponded to
HCV subtype 1a. To further check that the HCV present in
the PS was only of subtype 1a, PCR products of the
NS5B region were cloned and subsequently sequenced
individually. All the clones analyzed (n = 25) corresponded
to subtype 1a, which led us to discard the possibility of a
dual infection (HCV 1a/1b) in the PS. As a consequence,
no further analyses were performed on HCV-1b sequences
and the corresponding patients were excluded from the
outbreak investigation.
Sequences derived from samples putatively included in
the outbreak presented from 0 to 19 differences from the
PS sequence in this 229-nt region (mean = 2.37, SD = 3.31),
Figure 1 Distribution of differences in the NS5B region. Sequences were compared with a 229-nucleotide (nt) fragment of the NS5B gene
derived from the presumed source (PS). The graph shows the distribution of nucleotide differences (Hamming’s distance) for sequences derived
from patients included in the outbreak (red bars), from patients excluded (dark purple) from the outbreak, and from local controls (grey). The inset
shows the same distribution for putative outbreak samples (dark blue) and local controls (gray) before the former were divided into included and
excluded from the outbreak.
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trols and the PS sequence ranged from 3 to 14 (mean =
6.61, SD = 2.75). We observed a large number of cases
(n = 150) of perfect identity to the PS sequence in the
analyzed fragment and 69 and 23 sequences with only
1 and 2 differences, respectively, leading to a highly
asymmetric distribution of differences from the PS in
the outbreak sequences. This was in sharp contrast
with the distribution obtained for the control samples
(Figure 1). Hence, this initial analysis already identified
the existence of a large number of samples harboring
HCV of subtype 1a more closely related to the PS than
to the local controls, although it did not provide
enough resolution to clearly separate these 2 populations:
118 samples presumably from the outbreak presented a
number of differences that overlapped the range spanned
by the control samples.
Neighbor-joining and maximum likelihood phylogen-
etic trees obtained from the NS5B sequences failed to
group all the control samples in a monophyletic group
(Figure 2). Furthermore, none of the nodes in the phylo-
genetic tree received a bootstrap support higher than
70% by either phylogenetic reconstruction method. This is
not surprising considering that NS5B evolves much moreslowly than other regions in the HCV genome (especially
the E1-E2 region) and the relatively short sequence length
analyzed. As a consequence, the phylogenetic signal in this
region was too low to reliably separate the local controls,
the patients infected from a common source and the
patients infected from alternative sources.
We obtained 4,184 cloned sequences from the E1-E2
region of the HCV genome. For the PS, we obtained
134 cloned sequences from the only sample available
(taken on 12 February 1998). Under the Spanish legal
system, it was not possible to obtain another sample
from the suspected source of the outbreak and we
intended to estimate as accurately as possible the genetic
variability of the virus in the PS of the outbreak. Of the
remaining clones, 3,597 sequences corresponded to 321
samples initially considered to be in the outbreak, and 453
sequences were from 42 local controls. It was not possible
to obtain E1-E2 cloned sequences from two local controls
and one putative outbreak patient. Excluding the PS,
we set a goal of ten sequences per sample. The average
number of cloned sequences per patient actually
obtained excluding the PS was 10.77, ranging from 6 to
20 for the outbreak samples and from 10 to 30 for the
controls. Deviations from the initial goal were due to
Figure 2 Neighbor-joining tree obtained with the NS5B-region sequences of hepatitis C virus (HCV)-1a samples analyzed in this study.
Color codes: outbreak sequences are in black, red, and green (see legend to Figure 3), excluded from the outbreak are in dark purple, and local
unrelated controls are in gray. The presumed source (PS) sequence is shown in blue. No clade was found with bootstrap support higher than 70%.
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from the same patient. Once their coincident origin
was verified, they were considered as one single sample
in the ensuing analyses.
The 134 sequences derived from the PS were not identi-
cal to each other, presenting 28 different haplotypes and an
average of 2.07 differences in pairwise comparisons. These
sequences clustered in 2 groups, with 127 and 7 sequences,
respectively, which differed in their genetic variability. The
large group included 22 different haplotypes and was
less variable (haplotype diversity, H = 0.474; nucleotide
diversity, π = 0.0019) than the smaller group (6 haplotypes,
H = 0.952, π = 0.0075). The average nucleotide divergence
between the two groups was 0.0301.
After the multiple alignment was obtained (Additional
file 1), we derived neighbor-joining and maximum-
likelihood phylogenetic trees for the 4,184 cloned se-
quences. Both trees shared a highly supported internal
branch (bootstrap support = 100% and 96% after 1,000
replicates in the NJ and ML reconstructions, respectively),
which was used to define the patients included in the out-
break: sequences from 274 patients were grouped with the
sequences from the PS, while the second group included all
the sequences derived from the local controls andsequences from 47 patients initially considered to belong to
the outbreak (Figure 3 and Additional file 2).
Contrary to other cases of molecular epidemiological
analyses of outbreaks produced from one single individual
infected with an RNA virus (for example, [7]), paraphyly of
the source sequences was not the hallmark of the outbreak
and could not be used to define the extent of the outbreak
or which patients had actually been infected by the PS. The
minimum clade encompassing all the cloned sequences de-
rived from the PS (blue branches in Figure 3 and Additional
file 2) included 1,011 sequences from 97 different patients
(red branches in Figure 3 and Additional file 2). Under the
assumption of paraphyly, this would be the group of out-
break patients. However, not all the cloned sequences of
ten of these patients were included in this clade. A total of
52 sequences obtained from these 10 patients were in-
cluded in other groups, external to the clade defined by the
cloned sequences from the PS (green branches in Figure 3
and Additional file 2). We considered that these sequences
were also derived from the same initial population although
no representative of these variants had been found in the
sample analyzed from the PS (further discussed below). As
a consequence, we continued evaluating the minimum
clade that included all the cloned sequences derived from
Figure 3 Maximum likelihood tree for cloned sequences in the E1-E2 region. The tree includes 4,184 sequences from a 406-nucleotide (nt)
fragment of the E1-E2 region including hypervariable region (HVR)1 and HVR2. Sequences were obtained from patients included in the outbreak
(274 patients, 3,038 sequences), patients excluded from the outbreak (47 and 559, dark purple), local controls (42 and 453, gray), and the
presumed source (PS; 134 sequences, dark blue). Sequences and branches in the monophyletic clade defined by all the cloned sequences from
the PS are labeled in red. Sequences from polyphyletic samples with some representatives in the clade delimited by the PS sequences and others
outside it are labeled in green. Relevant nodes with bootstrap support larger than 90% are indicated by red dots. Further details can be obtained
in the annotated treefile provided as Additional file 2.
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was related to those from the PS or from a patient related
to the PS, as described above.
This procedure led to a larger monophyletic cluster
that included 3,038 sequences from 274 patients and
134 sequences from the PS (black, red, green and blue
branches in Figure 3 and Additional file 2). This cluster was
highly supported in the neighbor-joining and maximum-
likelihood phylogenetic reconstructions (Figure 3 and
Additional file 2) and it included no sequences from
the local controls. Sequences from the 42 local controls(gray branches in Figure 3 and Additional file 2) conformed
a separate cluster, also with high bootstrap support,
that also included 640 sequences from 47 patients
initially suspected to belong into the outbreak and
who were correspondingly removed from this category
(purple branches in Figure 3 and Additional file 2) and
considered to have been infected elsewhere despite their
epidemiological association to the PS. The assignment
of each individual presumably related to the outbreak to
one category or the other was further tested under a
more rigorous statistical framework.
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hypotheses: either the patient had been infected by the
PS and should be included in the outbreak, or had been
infected from a different source and should be excluded
from the outbreak. In the former case, sequences derived
from the case should group with those in the outbreak
whereas in the latter they should group with the controls
and the excluded patients. For each alternative, we
obtained the likelihood of the corresponding phylogen-
etic tree [14]. For sequences in the outbreak group, as
determined by the strongly supported interior branch
described above, the alternative hypothesis was evaluated
by computing the likelihood of the phylogenetic tree
obtained by moving all the sequences obtained from the
corresponding sample to the base of the clade defined
by control and non-outbreak samples (Additional file 3).
Similarly, the alternative phylogenetic tree for the ex-
cluded samples, which corresponded to their assignment
to the outbreak group, was obtained after shifting the
corresponding sequences to the base of the outbreak-
defining clade. The ratio between the two likelihoods is
a measure of the relative support provided by these data
to each hypothesis and, therefore, can be easily trans-
lated into an expert forensic evaluation [15].
For the cases assigned to the outbreak according to
the phylogenetic reconstruction described above we
obtained likelihood ratios (LRs) in the range 1.051 to
6.622 × 1095. The lowest values corresponded to the
patients whose sequences, although included in the
outbreak, were the closest to the control and non-
outbreak group. For these patients, the change in likelihood
was minimal, since the topologies used in the test were
devised as the most favorable for the accused (the PS), thus
minimizing the probability of incorrect assignment of
patients to the outbreak. For most patients (n = 240), the
LR value was higher than 105, which represents a very
strong support for their individual assignment to the out-
break group. Similarly, support values for those patients
who were finally excluded from the outbreak group,
given by the LR between this hypothesis and the alternative
of their inclusion in the outbreak, ranged between 1.330
and 4.408 × 1084, also providing very high support for their
lack of association to the outbreak. Based on these results,
47 patients who were initially considered to be part of it
because of their epidemiological links to the PS were
excluded from the outbreak. The court accepted this
argument and removed these patients from the court
process.
The phylogenetic analysis was consistent with the
epidemiological evidence in identifying the PS as the
source of the outbreak. In the next step of our analysis
we assumed that the PS was indeed the source and used
the Bayesian method with constant population size
and relaxed molecular clock implemented in BEAST(‘Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis by Sampling Trees’)
[16] to estimate the infection dates of the 274 patients
included in the outbreak. For each patient, E1-E2 cloned
sequences were used to establish the time to the most
recent common ancestor (MRCA) to the closest group
of E1-E2 cloned sequences derived from the PS. Apart
from the information on the dates when samples had been
obtained, we used the known infection dates of 24 patients
in the outbreak [17]. These patients were chosen because
they had had contact with the PS only once, at a known
date, and had tested negative for HCV before that date and
positive afterwards. Consequently, their sequences were
used to calibrate the molecular clock estimates for the
MRCA of each outbreak patient and the PS (Additional
file 4).
Estimates of divergence for each outbreak patient from
the PS ranged between January 1987 and April 1998. These
values correspond to the medians of the 95% Bayesian
highest posterior density (HPD) for each estimated date to
the MRCA with the PS. When the upper and lower ends of
each interval were considered, the latter date is not contra-
dictory with the detection of the outbreak in February
1998. The estimated time of infection for the PS was June
1988, with 95% HPD intervals ranging from August 1984
to October 1991, and it was thus compatible with the
earliest estimate for the date of infection of an outbreak
patient. The estimated time of infection for each patient
was compared to independently derived estimates by
the prosecution during the trial. These were based on
hospital records and other documents, and did not consider
any sequence-based information.
A comparison between these 2 estimates for each patient
is shown in Figure 4, where it can be observed that in 176
cases (65%) the HPD interval for the Bayesian estimate of
infection included the most likely estimated date given by
the prosecution to the court, based on documents and tes-
timonies from several sources, but in some cases alternative
dates were possible (Additional file 5: Figure S1). Most
differences between the two estimates corresponded either
to the oldest infections or to the most recent ones. The
former can be explained by lack of appropriate calibration
samples, since the earliest date in this group corresponded
to a patient infected in March 1995. It should be noted
that estimates correspond to divergence from the last
common ancestor and these should precede the actual
date of transmission from the source to the recipient. The
underestimation of the date of some recent infections may
stem from the still insufficient sampling of the PS viral
population. These patients were likely infected by a sub-
group of PS variants that were not represented in the PS
sample used in our analyses. If so, the estimates would
correspond to the time of divergence to the PS variants
included in our sampling, not actual infection dates, and
would predate them.
Figure 4 Inferred dates of infection. Each point shows the median estimate and the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) region estimated
using a relaxed molecular clock model, as detailed in the text. Prosecution estimates were taken as the most likely date according to the
prosecutor’s final report. The red dot represents the inferred date of divergence of the sequences derived from the presumed source from the
common ancestor of control sequences. No estimate of the infection date for the presumed source (PS) was given by the prosecution.
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The rapid rate of evolution of pathogenic RNA viruses
represents an important problem for the design and
application of efficient therapeutic and vaccination
strategies. However, it also represents an extraordinary
opportunity to observe evolution in real time [18]. In
the case described here, we used the fast evolutionary rate
of HCV to disentangle a large and complex transmission
process from a single source to almost 300 recipients
spanning over a decade, a period during which the infecting
viral population underwent evolutionary changes itself. The
process was further complicated by two additional issues: a
large number of potentially affected patients, several of
which might have been infected by HCV from alternative,
unidentified sources, and the need to provide individual ra-
ther than population-based statements about the likelihood
of having been infected or not from the presumed source
in a court setting.
The main difficulty encountered in the interpretation
of the expert testimony by the court (judges, prosecutors,
defense and accusation attorneys, and so on) was their
lack of familiarity with evolutionary theory and processes,
especially when these occur in such short timespans as
those involved in this case. The commonly held notion is
that evolution is a process that occurs over long periods of
time and that it can only be observed in scales of thousands
or millions of years, but not in months. The need for
variation in order to apply molecular evolution methods is
at odds with the search for identity between the geneticmarkers recovered in a crime scene and those of the poten-
tial culprits, or between the offspring and the alleged father
once maternal markers have been considered. These are
the most common type of data and situations in which
DNA profiling is brought to courts and, as a consequence,
what most people not familiar with evolutionary theory
expect to find in this type of expert testimony is a per-
fect match between the parental and the offspring viruses
indicating a direct relationship between the source and
the recipient. Molecular epidemiology analyses of rapidly
evolving microorganisms have to be framed within evolu-
tionary theory since only this provides the necessary
concepts to ascertain proximal and distal relatedness from
the observed genetic variation [18,19]. These principles
have been successfully applied in previous cases of HIV
transmission brought to courts [4,7,20,21] and to many
other cases of HIV and HCV transmissions that did not
lead to legal investigations [2,5,22-24]. However, none of
these involved the investigation and analysis of a large
number of potential recipients of the virus from the same
source, which continued evolving during the long period
in which infections occurred in the case considered here.
Previous cases of large HCV outbreaks affecting hun-
dreds of persons [25,26] were caused by contamination of
blood derivatives by a single donor. As a consequence, all
the infected patients received a very similar sample of the
virus population present in the corresponding sources at
the moment of blood donation. In these cases the com-
mon ancestry could be traced to a relatively homogeneous
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new host that, with no doubt, facilitates the identification
of a common origin of the outbreaks. In the case reported
here, the sequences recovered from the outbreak patients
correspond to different inoculums from a viral population
that had been evolving continuously under the pressure of
the immune system of the source for about 10 years, the
time since the infection of the anesthetist from an unknown
source until the detection of the outbreak and the cessation
of his professional activity. Evolution in the source during
the long period along which transmissions occurred further
combined with evolutionary changes in each infected
patient have produced a wide array of viral sequences
whose common ancestry could only be inferred after taking
into account the whole spectrum of variants generated
during the process.
In addition, there is mounting evidence that com-
partmentalization occurs in individuals infected with
HCV [27-33] and the analysis of E1-E2 cloned sequences in
patients related to this outbreak further supports this possi-
bility. Compartmentalization refers to the microevolution-
ary processes of viral populations occurring in separate
tissues and organs of an infected individual that might lead
to significant differences among subpopulations within that
individual. HCV is transmitted through blood, but the
blood is not the primary reservoir for the virus in the
infected body. In fact, although the liver is the main organ
infected by HCV, this virus has been shown to infect and
replicate in other tissues that will eventually contribute to
the HCV population circulating in the bloodstream.
In addition to compartmentalization, an additional
process has likely contributed to generate the complex
pattern of variation in the viral populations obtained
from the PS and the infected patients. Several features
of HCV populations such as re-emergence of variants
after treatment or lack of association between viral features
and response to treatment or disease progression have been
recently interpreted in light of within-patient dynamics of
the virus [34-36]. These analyses have revealed the coex-
istence of relatively divergent lineages within chronically,
but also acutely, infected patients that are not necessarily
present simultaneously in plasma. Given that HCV is
mainly transmitted through blood, which actual variants
are transmitted from the same source to different re-
cipients can vary depending on the viral population
circulating at the moment of infection. Although these
populations have been characterized in serial samples
from the same patients usually a few weeks or months
apart, it is evident that this same process may explain
differences observed on larger timescales. For instance,
patients receiving HCV-infected sera from a common
blood donor were shown to harbor different viral sub-
populations that were still present a few months/years
after infection and that evolved into well differentiatedclades a few years later [37]. Hence, it is possible that
compartmentalization and intra-patient fluctuations of
genetic variants caused a departure from the paraphyly
model postulated to characterize the populations of
donor and recipients in viral transmission cases [7] in
the case of the E1-E2 cloned sequences analyzed here,
if different patients received different viral inoculums
depending on the actual populations circulating in the
blood of the donor at the time of infection. Naturally,
further independent evolution within each new host
would enhance any differences at the time of infection.
In this case, it is also necessary to consider the long
period of infection of the PS, which further facilitates
differentiation of viral subpopulations within and among
compartments.
Paraphyly of source sequences is usually invoked to
determine the direction of transmission [7]. As discussed
previously, not all the sequences derived from patients
considered to be in the outbreak group were included in
the monophyletic group defined by the sequences derived
from the PS. Our preferred explanation for this observa-
tion has been discussed in the previous paragraphs, but it
could be hypothesized that the PS had been infected by
some of his patients and that he had subsequently infected
others. In this case, the PS would be an intermediate link
in a transmission chain and not the central hub in a large
series of transmission pairs. The reasons for discarding
this alternative possibility were as follows. There are two
ways in which some patients have non-monophyletic
sequences, with one group of them included in the
monophyletic group defined by the common ancestor
to the sequences of the PS and the other in separate,
but nevertheless related, groups. One is that each of these
patients had been coinfected by the PS and by an alterna-
tive source. The other is that there had been only one in-
fection from the PS but the infecting viruses were already
heterogeneous and relatively divergent in the source so that
differences between the two groups within these patients
would lead to the observed pattern. Our main argument
against the first possibility is that a secondary common
source (in fact several sources) would have to exist that
might explain their grouping with other sequences from
patients whose only known (and common) risk for HCV
infection was determined in the epidemiological investi-
gation to be the physician. How can we explain, and
prefer, the second possibility? Firstly, the already men-
tioned epidemiological linkage was very strong and it
led us to prefer any possibility with one single infection
rather than alternatives with two or more infections for
which no evidence was ever found. Secondly, we have
already discussed how compartmentalization within the
PS and viral evolution within him over a 10-year period
can explain the observed pattern without any need for
unsupported claims of other processes.
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work is appropriate for testing hypotheses derived from
previous, independent investigations. In this case, the
epidemiological enquiry revealed a highly likely source
for the outbreak and our goal was to test this hypothesis
as rigorously as possible. Given the size of the outbreak
and the prevalence of HCV infection in our country, it
was a likely possibility that not all the outbreak-related
cases had been infected by the same source, and this
was actually proven for 47 infections. Similarly, the
direction of the infection, although strongly suggested
from the global tree from the E1-E2 region shown in
Figure 2 to be from the PS to the patients and especially
for the smaller clade encompassing all the sequences
derived from the PS, was also grounded in our previous
knowledge of epidemiological investigation, with only
1 common link for the 275 patients included in the
outbreak (namely, their anesthetist). This implied a par-
ticular direction of the infections that is compatible
with the non-molecular evidence and also, as detailed
in the preceding paragraphs, with the sequence data
obtained once knowledge about the intrapatient dynamics
of chronically infecting virus such as HCV is taken into
account. As established by Evett and Weir [15], and further
discussed below, the scientific expert must give a quan-
titative estimate of the relative support that the data in
his/her domain provide to each hypotheses (innocence
or culpability), which should be considered along with
additional pieces of evidence gathered from other sources
of investigation.
We agree that this is an unusual and also unexpected
pattern for a single viral outbreak, but this is so not only
at the molecular level. As commented previously, this
was an unprecedented outbreak for an RNA virus capable
of establishing a chronic, asymptomatic infection, which
certainly contributed to its long duration and large number
of infected patients. A similar case, also involving a medical
professional spanning several years and in different
geographical locations with possibly dozens of infected
individuals from the same source, has been recently
reported in the USA [38]. If similar circumstances to
those exposed in the case described here concur in this
new case, we anticipate that similar patterns at the mo-
lecular epidemiological level will be observed. The actual
procedure on how the anesthetist infected so many of his
patients and the reasons for doing so are naturally out of
the scope of this report. Nevertheless, the court sentence
established that the anesthetist had used for himself the
same materials and drugs employed with his patients,
and that these uses were previous to the corresponding
medical acts (anesthesia, painkilling, and so on). No
evidence was established in the trial about him knowingly
infecting the patients or having information about his own
HCV-positive status.Molecular phylogenetic reconstructions have become
increasingly popular over the last few decades mainly as
a result of easy and cheap access to gene, genome and
other large-scale sequencing methods and to the devel-
opment of user-friendly platforms for the analysis of
sequence data. However, the direct application of these
methods in forensic analysis has to be made even more
cautiously than for general scientific enquiries given the
potentially serious consequences of a wrong inference or
conclusion in a criminal setting. Some of the problems
arising in the inference of transmission chains or outbreak
sources on the basis of molecular phylogenetic analyses
have been commented on elsewhere [39,40]. For instance,
the use of an inappropriate genome region can lead to
erroneous inferences, as we observed in the analysis of the
NS5B region in this outbreak.
The development of next-generation sequencing meth-
odologies for fast and accurate analysis of viral popula-
tions [41-43] has already led to its application in a case of
HCV transmission [44] and it might become eventually a
routine technique in this setting [45], thus overcoming
some of the limitations derived from the strategy of clon-
ing and sequencing PCR products that we had to use in
this work. Similarly, recent developments in algorithms
and computer speed and capabilities [46,47] may also allow
the application of more rigorous and encompassing
phylogenetic analyses than those we were able to apply
to these data, such as obtaining global estimates for the
dates of infection for all the patients in the outbreak or
using all the sequences available from each patient to
obtain those estimates.
Beyond methodological issues on the use of one or other
marker for molecular epidemiology or the most appropriate
model for phylogenetic inference, the application of
Evett and Weir’s [15] procedure and the extension that
we propose in this work are highly recommendable.
According to Evett and Weir, scientific experts must
inform on the likelihood of the observed data under
the different hypotheses and in light of other evidences
available. This is especially relevant in the determination of
outbreak sources because other alternative routes of infec-
tion, such as secondary infection from a primarily infected
patient or infection from a third unidentified source,
have to be ruled out. In the case described here, these
possibilities were discarded in the course of an exten-
sive epidemiological investigation and in our testimony
in court we simply provided an evaluation on the likelihood
of the sequences derived from each patient suspected to
have been infected from the presumed source. Similarly,
and in this situation this was notably important in terms of
preserving the assumption of innocence unless otherwise
proven, we were able to discard from the outbreak a group
of 47 patients who complied with all the epidemiological
criteria for inclusion in the outbreak but whose viruses had
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Conclusions
The combination of recent developments in molecular evo-
lutionary analysis and the statistical framework developed
for the forensic study of nucleic acid samples has allowed
us to incorporate molecular epidemiology, with its natural
components of molecular phylogenetics and population
genetics, into the realm of forensic analysis. Despite tre-
mendous progress in the prevention of infections by HCV
and other blood-borne viruses in the last decades, nosoco-
mial and other transmissions related to medical procedures
still occur [48,49]. Here, we have provided an adequate
methodology for the rigorous testing of alternative hypoth-
eses used in the epidemiological and forensic analysis of
these infections in a real, complex and massive case.
Methods
Source of INNO-LiPA, HCV II, Innogenetics, Ghent, Belgium-
positive samples
Persons suspected to have been exposed to HCV infection
by the PS were actively searched for by the regional Public
Health Services. Serum samples from these patients and
unrelated local controls were tested for HCV infection by
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) and further
confirmed by HCV-specific RNA amplification. Deter-
mination of HCV genotype was performed by reverse
hybridization of PCR amplicons of the 5′ non-coding re-
gion (INNO-LiPA HCV II, Innogenetics, Ghent, Belgium).
Samples and patients
Samples were collected as contemporarily as possible. To
avoid cross-contamination, each sample was physically iso-
lated during RNA purification and gloves were changed fre-
quently during all procedures. Different laboratories and
devices were used for RNA isolation, DNA amplification,
cloning and sequencing, and negative controls were in-
cluded at all steps.
RNA extraction and reverse transcription
Viral RNA was purified from 200 μl of serum using the
High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche Diagnostics GmbH,
Mannheim, Germany). RT was carried out in a 20-μl vol-
ume containing 5 μl of eluted RNA, 5 × RT buffer, 500 μM
of each dNTP, 1 μM of hexamers, 100 U of M-MLV Re-
verse Transcriptase (Promega Corp., Madison, WI, USA),
and 20 U of Recombinant RNasin® Ribonuclease Inhibitor
(Promega). Reaction mixtures were incubated at 37°C for
60 minutes, followed by 2 minutes at 95°C.
Amplification and direct sequencing of the NS5B region
Direct sequences of PCR products were obtained for a
337-nt fragment of the NS5B gene, although we used onlya 229-nt subfragment corresponding to the sequence of
the PS initially determined by another laboratory. PCRs
were performed in a 50-μl volume containing 5 μl of RT
product, 100 μM of each dNTP, 200 nM of each primer,
and 2.5 U of Taq polymerase (Amersham Biosciences,
Piscataway, NJ, USA). Oligonucleotides used for ampli-
fication and direct sequencing of NS5B region were:
5′-TATGATACYCGCTGYTTYGACTC-3′ (sense) and
5′-GTACCTRGTCATAGCCTCCGTGAA-3′ (antisense).
Direct sequencing of purified PCR products was performed
on an 8-μl volume, including 1.0 μl of DNA, with the
ABI PRISM BigDye Terminator Cycle Sequencing Ready
Reaction kit in ABI 377 or ABI 310 automated sequencers
(Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA). Both strands
were assembled using the Staden Package. Sequences were
verified and deposited in GenBank with accession numbers
FR670793-FR671156.
Amplification, cloning and sequencing of the E1-E2 region
A 406-nt fragment of the E1-E2 region was amplified by
nested PCR. The first amplification was performed in a
100-μl volume containing 10 μl of cDNA, 10 × PCR buffer,
100 μM (each) dNTP, 400 nM (each) oligonucleotide
and 2.5 U of Pfu DNA polymerase (Stratagene, La Jolla,
CA, USA). Oligonucleotides used for amplification of
E1-E2 region were: 5′-CGCATGGCATGGRATATGAT-3′
(sense), 5′-GGAGTGAAGCARTAYACYGG-3′ (antisense),
5′-GGRATATGATGATGAACTGGTC-3′ (nested sense).
Both primary and nested PCR were performed with the
following thermal profile: 94°C for 3 minutes; 5 cycles at
94°C for 30 s, 55°C for 30 s, and 72°C for 3 minutes; 35
cycles at 94°C for 30 s, 52°C for 30 s, and 72°C for 3
minutes; and a final extension at 72°C for 10 minutes.
Amplification products were purified and directly cloned in
EcoRV-digested pBluescript II SK(+) phagemid (Stratagene).
Plasmid DNA was purified with the High Pure Plasmid
Isolation Kit (Roche). Recombinant clones were sequenced
by the use of KS and SK oligonucleotides (Stratagene) and
the same procedure described above for the NS5B region
but using 5 μl of purified cloned DNA. The obtained
sequences have been deposited in GenBank with accession
numbers FR671450-FR675633.
Molecular phylogenetics and evolutionary analysis
Multiple alignments were obtained with ClustalW 1.82 [50].
Estimates of Hamming’s distance between each NS5B
sequence and that obtained from the PS were obtained
with MEGA 2.0 [51]. Due to computational limitations
at the time of the initial analysis (1999 to 2001), an initial
phylogenetic tree was obtained with the neighbor-joining
algorithm [52] using Kimura-2P distance [53] for pairs
of sequences with program ClustalW. Subsequently, the
same sequences were used with program PHYML [54]
to obtain a maximum likelihood tree using the GTR + I + G
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Support for internal nodes was evaluated with 1,000
bootstrap replicates [57].
Statistical analysis of competing hypothesis
We adopted Evett and Weir’s [15] method for the use
of genetic analyses in forensic settings using a Bayesian
framework. This method is consistent with the judicial
procedures in Spanish courts. Briefly, these authors indicate
that scientific experts’ contribution to forensic analyses of
genetic information should restrict to the evaluation of the
available genetic data in light of the two competing hypoth-
eses, those of the prosecution and the defense. The jury or
judges must integrate that information, ideally in a numer-
ical way, with the information provided by other types of
evidence. Formally, this is accomplished by computing the
ratio of two posterior probabilities, those of the prosecution
and the defense proposals conditioned on all types of
evidence for whose computation it is necessary to use
the corresponding priors, here defined as the probability
of each hypothesis in light of the non-genetic evidence (I),
and the likelihood of the genetic data (G) conditioned on
the non-genetic evidence and each hypothesis (Hp and Hd):
PrðHpjG; IÞ
Pr HdjG; Ið Þ ¼
PrðGjHp; IÞ
Pr GjHd; Ið Þ 
PrðHp Ij Þ
Pr Hd Ij Þð
In the context of molecular phylogenetic analysis applied
to forensic epidemiology, the two competing hypotheses
correspond to the assignment of a given patient to the
group of patients infected from a common source or to that
of control sequences in which there is no common source
of infection. The evaluation of competing phylogenetic
hypotheses under a maximum likelihood framework
directly provides their likelihood ratio (LR), thus allowing
us to derive individual estimates of the support from the
sequence data to the two relevant alternative proposals:
(i) a given patient was infected with HCV in the outbreak,
and as a consequence viral sequences obtained from
him that share a closer common ancestor with those
obtained from the source and other patients in the out-
break, or (ii) the patient was infected from other source
not linked to the outbreak, so that his or her viral se-
quences are evolutionarily closer to those from con-
trols and patients excluded from the outbreak than to
sequences from outbreak patients. Hence, it is possible
to provide quantitative criteria for deciding between
alternative possibilities to the jury or those in charge of
taking a judicial decision.
Patients were included or excluded in the outbreak
depending on their grouping in the phylogenetic tree
of the E1-E2 region sequences. The likelihood of each al-
ternative topology was obtained with program fastDNAml
[58], allowing it to optimize branch lengths for each case.The LR for each patient was computed considering the
whole data set: the PS, the controls, the excluded patients,
the remaining patients in the outbreak and the target pa-
tient. Hence, values are referred to the change in likelihood
of the E1-E2 cloned sequences tree when the sequences
of each patient were placed in the node delimiting the
controls and non-outbreak clade (for outbreak patients)
or the outbreak clade (or non-outbreak patients).
Estimation of infection dates in the Bayesian Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) framework
The relaxed molecular clock model [59] implemented
in BEAST [16], under constant population size (more
complex models did not increase the accuracy of the
estimation; [17]) and using the GTR + I + G model,
was used to estimate the infection dates of the 274 patients
included in the outbreak and for whom E1-E2-region
cloned sequences were available. Sequences from 24
patients for which the infection dates were known with
certainty were employed to calibrate the clock [17].
The method used here for the estimation of infection
dates is an extension of the approach we used previously
in a validation study that tested the accuracy of estimation
of infection dates in this outbreak using the Bayesian
approach [17] for the 24 patients whose infection dates
were known. The calibration assumed that the infec-
tion dates for these 24 patients corresponded to the
time of the most recent common ancestor between the
sequences of a given patient and the appropriate PS popu-
lation (see above). In all the analyses, the tips were dated
with the corresponding sampling times for all the patients,
controls and the PS. For computational reasons, estimates
of dates of infection were obtained separately for each of
the 249 patients with E1-E2 sequences. For this, 1 sequence
from each target patient, 1 from each of the 24 patients
used for calibration, and 2 sequences from the PS were
used in each estimate run.
Based on previous results [17], the parameters in the
evolutionary and the coalescent model were given uni-
form or little-constrained priors (Additional file 4). The
values for the parameters were saved every 500 steps
and the trees every 5,000 steps. The pre-burn-in was
100,000 steps, and the burn-in was 300,000 steps. For
several patients the number of steps necessary for all the
parameters to have the adequate effective sample size
(ESS >200) differed by an order of magnitude (from
about 1 × 106 to 3 × 107 steps).
Additional files
Additional file 1: Phylip-formatted file with the E1-E2 sequences
used in the phylogenetic reconstruction and analyses of the outbreak.
Additional file 2: Nexus file corresponding to the maximum likelihood
tree shown in Figure 3. Each sequence has been colored according to the
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with FigTree (available from http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree).
Additional file 3: Newick file used to test the alternative hypothesis
for each patient suspected to be part of the outbreak. This tree was
manually edited to replace the sequence labeled ‘test’ by the clade
conformed by all the sequences derived from each patient and its likelihood
was compared with that of the original tree (without the ‘test’ sequence).
Additional file 4: BEAST (‘Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis by
Sampling Trees’) file used for deriving the date of infection of
patients included in the outbreak. This file corresponds to patient
10,067 and the sequenced used was picked at random from the cloned
E1-E2 sequences available for this patient. The same procedure, using
one random E1-E2 sequence, was applied to the remaining patients in
the outbreak.
Additional file 5: Figure S1. Comparison between estimates of
infection dates obtained by the Bayesian method with a relaxed
molecular clock implemented in BEAST (‘Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis
by Sampling Trees’) and those obtained independently by the
prosecution when more than one possible infection date was considered
likely by the prosecution. Bayesian estimates are provided as medians
and 95% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals. Prosecution estimates
are shown as red (most likely date of infection as indicated during the
trial) or dark-blue dots (alternative dates).
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